Tales & Co.

Istanbul — San Francisco

Notes

Growth discipline

6 min read

A Project Never Stopped Keeps Billing the Company

Capacity is not something a company has. It is something a company releases, and the only event that releases it is an ending. Every project left running is still charging for what it holds.

Stopping is the only way a company creates capacity.

Planning conversations treat capacity as something a company has: a headcount, a budget, a roadmap with room left in it. The more accurate picture is that capacity is something a company releases, and the only event that releases it is an ending. Hiring adds people, but it also adds onboarding, management load and coordination. A stopped project gives back people who already know the product, the systems and the customers, and it does so within a week.

What a running project holds

Every initiative that is alive is holding something, whether or not it is producing anything. It holds a share of several people's weeks. It holds a slot in the release calendar and a place in the queue of the platform team. It holds time on the leadership agenda, and a line in the monthly report that someone has to prepare. A project that is still running is charging the company for all of these, whether or not the premise behind it still stands.

The charge is paid in fragments. An engineer who spends two days a week on a programme that is going nowhere still appears on the team roster as an engineer. The cost shows up as work that did not happen elsewhere, and nobody records work that did not happen.

The cost of an unstopped project lands on the projects that deserve to finish.

A pattern seen in digital banking product teams shows where it lands. A team carries a roadmap of six initiatives and a delivery rate that supports about four. Nobody chose the six. They accumulated, each one defensible when it was approved and none of them ever removed. The visible symptom is that everything is slightly late. The less visible one is that the two or three initiatives with the strongest evidence run at the pace of the weakest, because they draw on the same designers, the same risk reviewers and the same release window.

Three places the charge appears

The charge turns up in three forms, and a leadership team can look for each of them without any new tooling.

  • Split attention: people assigned in fractions to several initiatives, so that none receives a full week of anyone and every context switch is an unrecorded cost.
  • Queue time: shared functions such as risk review, platform engineering and legal, where a request from a fading project waits ahead of one from a healthy project because it arrived first.
  • Agenda weight: senior review time spent every cycle on initiatives nobody expects to change, because taking them off the agenda would itself be a decision.

None of the three appears on a project's own status page. They appear as a lengthening of the whole portfolio's cycle time, which is why the usual response is to ask every team to move faster rather than to ask which work should not be moving at all.

An organisation learns from what it watches end.

The second cost is slower and larger. People calibrate their behaviour to what happens to work after it begins. In a company where projects end, an estimate is a statement that can be checked and a pilot is a pilot. In a company where nothing ends, estimates drift because nobody pays for the drift, pilots turn into permanent features, and the sensible way to protect a team is to keep its projects alive. Bad news about a project is a threat to its existence, so it travels late.

What a portfolio teaches

A leadership team that has stopped nothing for a year has also told its organisation nothing for a year about what it values. The roadmap says everything matters. A portfolio that cannot end anything is not choosing among its priorities. It is only adding to them.

A portfolio that cannot end anything is not choosing among its priorities.

What the next sponsor inherits

The effect compounds. Sponsors of new initiatives read the history and conclude that an ending is not a risk they will ever face, so cases are written with less care and the conditions under which the work would stop are left out. That is the gap that a stop condition written before the project starts is meant to close, and it is much harder to close in a company whose past projects were all allowed to fade.

A capacity ledger makes the holdings readable.

The method is small. It is a table, built once and then reviewed on the cadence of the quarter, whose purpose is to put what each project holds next to the evidence that it should still hold it. It does not decide anything. It decides which conversations are overdue.

What goes in each row

Each live initiative gets one row, and the row answers four questions in plain terms:

  • Which people work on it, and what share of their time?
  • Which shared queues does it sit in, and where in the queue?
  • How much senior review time does it take in a quarter?
  • What is the last observable sign that its premise still holds, and when was it seen?

The last question does the work. An initiative whose last sign is more than a quarter old is holding capacity against a belief nobody has tested recently. That is not a ruling that it should stop. It is a ruling that it should be discussed.

Reading the ledger

Two readings are worth the effort. The first is the total. The fractions in the first column rarely add up to the headcount that exists, and the gap is the time lost to switching and waiting. The second is the oldest rows, the initiatives with the longest history and the thinnest recent evidence, which tend to be the ones with the strongest attachments as well.

How any single row is then resolved is a separate act. Who holds the right to end it and how a running project is judged on forward cost and forward value are covered earlier in this series. The ledger's job is narrower: it makes the cost of not deciding visible to the person who has to decide.

A stop rate shows whether the portfolio can still choose.

One further number is worth tracking, and it needs no precision: how many initiatives ended in the last two quarters, against how many began. A company that has started many and ended none is not at the limit of its ambition. It is at the limit of its capacity and has not noticed.

What a healthy ending looks like

A portfolio in good health ends something most quarters, and the endings include reasonable bets that did not pay. That is worth stating aloud when it happens. An ending that follows the evidence is a result the company paid for and can now use, and it should be recorded as one. Teams that watch a stop handled that way take smaller risks more honestly, since a bet that fails no longer threatens the people who placed it.

The alternative is the pattern most leadership teams already know: a long list, a short temper, and a standing sense that the work is behind. The company is paying for work that stopped earning, and it is paying out of the capacity meant for work that has not started yet.

Where this thinking becomes work.

Where a portfolio has outgrown the teams carrying it, the first piece of work is the ledger. It is built with a finance partner and one person from each shared function, because the people closest to a project hold the fragments and are the least placed to add them up. Our consulting practice runs it as an outside read inside the growth discipline pillar.

The output is a short list: initiatives that continue at full capacity, initiatives that stop, and initiatives whose premise needs a test before anything more is spent on them. The capacity returned by the second group is, in most cases, the cheapest capacity the company will find that year.